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Abstract 
John D. Norton is responsible for a number of influential views in contemporary philosophy of 
science. This paper will discuss two of them. The material theory of induction claims that 
inductive arguments are ultimately justified by their material features, not their formal features. 
Thus, while a deductive argument can be valid irrespective of the content of the propositions that 
make up the argument, an inductive argument about, say, apples, will be justified (or not) 
depending on facts about apples. The argument view of thought experiments claims that thought 
experiments are arguments, and that they function epistemically however arguments do. These 
two views have generated a great deal of discussion, although there hasn’t been much written 
about their combination. I argue that despite some interesting harmonies, there is a serious 
tension between them. I consider several options for easing this tension, before suggesting a set 
of changes to the argument view that I take to be consistent with Norton’s fundamental 
philosophical commitments, and which retain what seems intuitively correct about the argument 
view. These changes require that we move away from a unitary epistemology of thought 
experiments and towards a more pluralist position. 
Keywords: Material theory of induction; Thought experiments; John D. Norton; Role of logic in 
reasoning; Pluralism; Empiricism 
Highlights 
John Norton’s material theory of induction is in tension with his view of thought experiments as 
arguments. 
A way to combine the two views is presented, which proceeds by limiting the scope of the 
argument view, as follows. 
We separate the epistemology of the creation, performance, performer, and interpretation of 
thought experiments. 
And of these, a material argument view should aim to account for the epistemology of the 
interpretation only. 




John D. Norton has had a tremendous impact on contemporary philosophy of science, not just 
through his written work, but also through his efforts to increase open-access policies in 
philosophy of science, and by using his role as director of the Center for Philosophy of Science 
at the University of Pittsburgh to make the culture of philosophy of science more inclusive and 
collegial. In terms of his written work, he has published over one hundred articles and chapters 
on topics ranging from quantum mechanics to the paradoxes of sailing (Norton 2012). At least 
one-third of his work concerns relativity, and more than one-fifth spotlights Einstein, many of 
whose successes, failures, and cryptic remarks Norton has illuminated (some personal favourites: 
Norton 2005a, 2010a, 2013). His work on induction (one-tenth) and thought experiments (one-
tenth) also make up substantial pieces of his philosophical pie.  
The Nortonian corpus is united by several fundamental commitments. First, his philosophical 
claims are always connected to and informed by actual scientific practice. Second, there is a 
consistent focus on the epistemology of scientific reasoning. Third, Norton is a committed 
empiricist. Each of these are identifiable in his work on induction and thought experiments. For 
example, according to his material theory of induction, it is facts about the world discovered 
through experience that justify the inductive inferences that amplify our knowledge, and Norton 
argues for this using case studies drawn from the history of science. In his work on thought 
experiments, Norton argues for an empiricist position by claiming that thought experiments are 
just arguments, and their epistemology is just the epistemology of arguments. Again, he supports 
his position using historical case studies. 
Given that Norton always sails by the same philosophical compass, it is natural to assume that 
the conclusions he reaches on different topics will be mutually supportive. Still, Norton himself 
hasn't anywhere explained how his ideas about induction and thought experiments fit together. In 
the next section I will present Norton’s views on induction. Then I will discuss his work on 
thought experiments to show that, surprisingly, there is a tension between the two. I will examine 
several possibilities for easing this tension, and argue that one preserves more of Norton’s claims 
and fundamental commitments, as well as what seems right to me about the argument view.  
2 The Material Theory of Induction 
For Norton, we can characterize the power of induction to amplify knowledge formally or 
materially. Formal theories attempt to do for induction what logicians have already done for 
deduction: identify universal schema for inference, like modus ponens and tollens, which are 
valid under all substitutions of content. To do this, formal theories of induction separate the 
material aspects of an inductive inference (the content) from its formal aspects (the structure) in 
order to isolate what is common to the structures of successful inductive inferences. According 
to formal theories of induction, “valid inductive inferences are distinguished by their conformity 
to universal templates. They may be simple, such as the template that licenses an inference from 
some past A’s being B to the conclusion that all A’s are B. Or they may be more complicated, 
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such as the requirement that degrees of inductive support conform to the probability calculus” 
(Norton 2014, 673). 
However, Norton argues that formal theories of induction have not, and cannot succeed. Take the 
following example. Suppose we find that a pure sample of bismuth has a melting point of 271 
degrees Celsius. From this, we infer inductively that all pure samples of bismuth will have that 
melting point. Formal theories justify this induction with reference to formal features of the 
universal schema that the inference instantiates, which in this case, is enumerative induction. 
But, and here is the problem with formal theories, the fact that a sample of wax melts at 91 
degrees does not tell us that all other samples of wax will melt at 91 degrees (Norton 2003, 649). 
Why not? Both inferences, the good one about bismuth and the bad one about wax, instantiate 
exactly the same formal schema: some past A’s are B, therefore all A’s are B. In the case of 
deduction, the meaning of the logical connectives guarantees the truth of the conclusion given 
the truth of the premises. But this can never be the case for induction. In a series of papers and 
forthcoming book, Norton argues that no formal theory of induction is capable of identifying 
universal schema for successful inductive inferences (2003, 2005b, 2010b, 2014, forthcoming).  
Individual enumerative inductions can of course be warranted, but it is not formal properties that 
warrant them: it is background facts about the subject of the inference. Norton calls these 
background facts “material principles.” In general, the material principles that “authorize” 
inductive inferences are truths of the domain we are interested in. In the case of bismuth, the 
material principle is the fact that pure samples of chemical elements all have the same melting 
point (and this fact is underwritten by other facts in chemistry and physics) (2003, 650). Such 
facts “warrant a local mini-logic, peculiar to the context,” in which we are licensed to proceed 
from some particular evidence to a more general conclusion (forthcoming ch. 1, 23). In the case 
of bismuth, the local mini-logic might be: If x is a pure sample of chemical element y, and x has 
a melting point of z, generally, all other pure samples of y will have melting point z. This is only 
a mini-logic because we cannot eliminate reference to terms like “chemical element” and 
“melting point.” And it is the “generally” that makes the inference inductive and not deductive. 
The appearance of that word indicates an admission of inductive risk. Bismuth, or the next 
element, might be the first to undermine our material principle. 
To put Norton’s argument against formal theories of induction another way, he notes that these 
theories have tried to follow the example of deductive logic, but in fact they should have 
proceeded in a manner that is just the opposite. Deductive logic can be pursued relatively 
independently of experience, and its results can then be applied to identify and evaluate actual 
inferences. For induction, justification proceeds in the other direction: We discover what is 
generalizable first, via empirical investigation, and through these discoveries (material 
principles) we decide which inductive inferences are warranted. 
3 The Argument View of Thought Experiments 
In 1986, James R. Brown pointed out (following Kuhn 1977) that thought experiments in physics 
seem to provide new knowledge that comes neither from valid logical inference, nor from new 
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experience. According to Brown, the best explanation for the success of some thought 
experiments is that they occasionally (and fallibly) allow us to “see” or “intuit” the relations 
between universals that constitute the laws of nature (Brown 1986, 1991, 1993, 2004, 2007). 
Norton denies Brown’s conclusion: thought experiments never provide a priori empirical 
knowledge about nature. Instead, they are just arguments. Since arguments merely rearrange 
existing knowledge, no rationalist insight will be required to explain scientific advancement via 
thought experiments (Norton 1991, 2004a, 2004b). This position has been dubbed “the argument 
view” (e.g., Bishop 1998, 22; Brendel 2018, 291), and it serves several purposes for Norton: it 
defends empiricism, gives Norton a way to evaluate a tool wielded so powerfully in science by 
Einstein and others (see e.g., Norton 1991, 2013, 2018), and most importantly, tells us how 
“thought experiments are supposed to give us knowledge of the natural world.” We should like 
to know, “From where does this knowledge come?” (Norton 2004b, 44). The answer is, from 
previous knowledge, augmented or amplified through deduction or induction. 
The account has developed over the years, becoming “a kind of moving target” (Brendel 2018, 
283). Following Elke Brendel (2018, 283), we can divide the argument view into seven theses: 
Identity Thesis: Thought experiments are (type)-identical with arguments.1  
Reconstruction Thesis: Thought experiments “can always be reconstructed as arguments” 
(Norton 2004a, 1142).2 
Reliability Thesis: A thought experiment is a “reliable mode of inquiry” only if the 
argument into which it can be reconstructed justifies its conclusion (2004b, 52).  
Elimination Thesis: “Any conclusion reached by a (successful) scientific thought 
experiment will also be demonstrable by a non-thought-experimental argument” (Gendler 
2000, 34).3 
Epistemic Thesis: Thought experiments and the arguments associated with them have the 
same epistemic reach and epistemic significance.  
Empirical Psychological Thesis: “The actual conduct of a thought experiment consists of 
the execution of an argument” (Norton 2004b, 50).4 
Empiricist Thesis: The result of a thought experiment can only come from experience: 
“The result of a thought experiment must be the reformulation of...experience by a 
process that preserves truth or its probability” (Norton 2004a, 1142). 
                                                 
1 See Bishop (1999) and Häggqvist (2009) for criticism. 
2 See Brown (1992, 275) and Stuart (2016) for criticism. 
3 See Gendler (1998) for criticism. 
4 See Nersessian (1992) and Brendel (2018) for criticism. 
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These theses are supported by various considerations. Here is my own reconstruction of what I 
think is the most detailed and mature version of the argument that connects them all (drawing on 
Norton 2004a, 2004b). 
A) Assume empiricism. Good empiricists should maintain a healthy skepticism against 
“epistemic magic” (Norton 2004b, 45). For empiricists, we only obtain and increase our 
knowledge by experience and logical manipulation of that experience, and we should 
develop an epistemology of thought experiments that reflects this. (Empiricist thesis) 
B) As a matter of fact, we notice that all the thought experiments we have investigated can 
be reconstructed as arguments.  
Inductive step: generally, all thought experiments will be reconstructible as 
arguments. (Reconstruction thesis) 
C) As a matter of fact, we notice that all the thought experiments we have investigated have 
the same epistemological strengths and weaknesses as their logical reconstructions.  
Inductive step: generally, all thought experiments will be equally justified as their 
logical reconstructions. 
D) If a thought experiment is not an argument, we need some other way of telling whether 
the thought experiment is justified or not. And as a matter of fact, there is no such way 
that does not reduce in the end to logic (Reliability thesis) 
E) From A), B), C) and D): thought experiments are eliminable from discussions about the 
epistemology of science, at least in principle. (Elimination thesis) 
F) From A), which implies a desire for ontological parsimony, plus B), C), D), and E): we 
can treat thought experiments as arguments. (Identity thesis) 
G) From C), D), E) and F): we are licensed to pursue the epistemology of thought 
experiments exclusively as the epistemology of arguments. (Epistemic thesis) 
H) The only (or best) explanation of B), C) and D) is that thought experiments are not just 
treatable as arguments; they are exactly the same as arguments, even psychologically. 
The execution of a thought experiment is thus always just the execution of an argument. 
(Empirical Psychological thesis) 
This is the argument for the argument view.5 Its success depends heavily on what Norton means 
by “argument.” Logic textbooks tell us that arguments are sets of statements that admit of the 
division between premise and conclusion. Norton demands an even more encompassing 
definition: “I stress here that this thesis invokes a notion of argumentation that is far more 
general than the one usually invoked in logic texts” (Norton 2004b, 52). Indeed, Norton allows 
that diagrams may be premises (2004b, 58), premises may be tacit (1996, 339) and inferences 
may be tacit (1991, 142-3 note 2).  
More positively, Norton remarks that anything “licensed” or “governed” by a deductive, 
inductive, abductive, or informal logic is an argument (2004b, 64 and 2004a, 1140 respectively). 
                                                 
5 Notice that it uses a combination of argument styles. A) is argued for by appeal to tradition, popularity, or 
intuition. B) through G) present a series of steps that begins with the practice of science as data, and infers to the 
identity of thought experiments and arguments via a combination of induction and deduction. H) is an inference to 
the best explanation. 
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Norton’s notion of argument therefore also depends on his notion of logic. For Norton, logic is 
any systematization that distinguishes between form and content, and focuses on form (2004b, 
53). It need not work upon propositions, e.g., Bayesianism is a logic despite the fact that it can 
operate upon probability distributions rather than propositions. A logic also need not preserve 
truth or operate only using true premises, and it need not be restricted to systems that avoid 
contradictory conclusions (2004b, 53). An argument, therefore, is anything that has formal as 
well as material components, and whose formal components allow logic to classify it as (in)valid 
or (non)cogent. Finally, even if something can only be classified and evaluated by a future logic, 
it may still count as an argument now (2004b, 54-55). 
The argument view aims to explain how scientific thought experiments increase our knowledge. 
For Norton, there is a defining “mark” that tells us whether a given thought experiment is valid 
or cogent. The mark is completely internal: a structural feature that can be identified by “merely 
reading its text” (2004a, 1143). The mark identifies justified inferences by flagging formal 
features, including the logical relations that connect conclusions to premises. While Norton 
claims that there is “something in the logic that evidently confers the power of a thought 
experiment to justify its conclusion” (Norton 2004b, 54), I think we should read this claim not in 
the sense that logic itself justifies arguments, but that it identifies and explains the justification 
already present in valid or cogent arguments, which they have due to their logical properties. For 
instance, an argument that instantiates modus ponens is a good one not simply because logicians 
say so, but because the logical form of modus ponens is such that it guarantees the truth of the 
conclusion given the truth of the premises. 
There are questions that it would be natural to raise at this point. For one, Norton tends to stress 
validity and cogency over soundness. For example, he claims that the mark of a good thought 
experiment “is just that the thought experiment either uses an argument form licensed by a logic 
or can be reconstructed as one” (2004b, 54; my emphasis). This may be worrying, because an 
argument will only give us new knowledge if it is sound: validity and cogency are not enough. 
Also, there is a threat of triviality, since, for Norton, arguments are whatever can be evaluated by 
a present or future logic, and ideal future logics will eventually be able to reconstruct all 
inferences. Thus, every inference becomes an argument by definition (see Stuart 2016). But in 
any case, the present purpose is not to argue against Norton’s argument view, but rather to see 
how it combines with the material theory of induction. 
4 Combining the Two Accounts 
To combine the material theory of induction with the argument view of thought experiments, we 
must first identify some inductive thought experiments, i.e., thought experiments that, on 
Norton’s view, are to be identified as inductive arguments. For Norton, these are all the thought 
experiments that cannot be reconstructed as deductive arguments, thus, any that proceed via 
inference to the best explanation or diagrammatic reasoning, or whose conclusion is logically 
stronger than its premises. For example, in Einstein’s elevator thought experiment, one observer 
is placed in an opaque chest that is in a gravitational field (e.g., on the surface of the earth), while 
another is placed in a different opaque chest, away from any gravitational fields, but which is 
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being accelerated upwards in a way that creates the same downward pull experienced by the 
observer in the first chest. Einstein challenges us to find a way to tell the difference, 
observationally, between the two cases. We find that we cannot. Next, we induce from the 
equivalence of the phenomena experienced by the two imagined observers in the two opaque 
chests to the equivalence of all phenomena in such conditions. Once this is done, we can identify 
inertial frames with gravitational fields. The material principles Norton identifies (though not by 
that name, as he was writing before he published on the material theory) are that “the case is 
typical” and “the presence of the chest and observer are inessential to the equivalence” (Norton 
1991, 137). The formal properties of this inference do not determine its quality; the material 
principles do. If they are doubtful, the inference fails.  
Another example is Newton’s bucket and Mach’s response. Both of these appear to be inferences 
to the best explanation. For Newton, the best explanation of the concavity of the water’s surface 
is rotation with respect to absolute space. One interpretation of Mach’s response is that the best 
explanation of the concavity of the water’s surface is rotation with respect to the other masses in 
the universe. On a formal theory of induction, we are told to identify which is the better 
explanation. But how do we do that? Formal measures have not provided any workable account 
of what makes one explanation better than another. In practice, we don’t appeal to formal 
accounts of explanatory quality, but consider the reasons given against the other explanations, 
and the reasons given in favour of the preferred explanation, as well as the plausibility of the 
background assumptions. And this is precisely what the material theory of induction 
recommends we do to decide between Newton and Mach. 
The general idea, then, is that a combination of the argument view and the material theory of 
induction will take thought experiments that amplify our knowledge, identify them with 
inductive arguments, and provide an analysis of the justification of their conclusions not in terms 
of the formal aspects of the arguments, but the material aspects. I’ll start by noting some exciting 
upshots of this combination of views. 
First, the above-mentioned reconstructions of Einstein’s elevator and Newton/Mach’s bucket 
(while needing to be fleshed out) do seem prima facie plausible, and we can imagine how the 
same could be done for other inductive thought experiments. In other words, by combining these 
views, we gain a new and possibly powerful way of evaluating inductive thought experiments, 
via the identification and analysis of material principles.  
Second, Norton seems to have presaged the material theory in his work on thought experiments. 
He argues in 1991 that there will always be some particulars that appear in the premises of 
inductive thought experiments that will not appear in the conclusion (Norton 1991). This is 
because the set up of any inductive thought experiment is always a specific scenario, not all of 
whose features are relevant to the more general conclusion. The elimination of particulars to 
arrive at something general is accomplished by an “inductive step” (1991, 131). “This step might 
involve the assertion that the case involving the particulars is ‘typical’ or that the particulars are 
‘inessential,’ so that the result derived holds in other cases as well” (131). This seems to be 
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evidence that it was already clear to Norton in 1991 that material principles are needed to license 
the inductive steps found in thought experiments.  
Third, a consequence of this combination of views is that we are never licensed to say how 
justified the conclusion of an inductive thought experiment is until we have examined the 
relevant material principles that justify it. And it is unlikely that we will ever be able to say how 
justified a thought experiment is in any “objective” or acontextual sense, because the uncertainty 
in the material principles relies on the uncertainty of other facts in the web of scientific 
knowledge, which is in a constant state of change. The most we can say about a scientific 
thought experiment is that as far as we know it is justified. And this reflects scientific practice. If 
you bring up a famous thought experiment to a scientist and ask them if it was a good one, they 
usually say “Well, at the time, given what was then known, yes [or no]. But now…” and then 
they praise or condemn the thought experiment depending on how much relevant change there 
has been to the state of knowledge since the thought experiment was introduced. (This 
development contradicts Norton’s earlier claim that the conclusion of a thought experiment is 
justified acontextually, since the justifying “mark” is logical and therefore independent of 
context (Norton 2004a, 1143). But perhaps Norton would now agree that inductive thought 
experiments cannot be evaluated without reference to their context). 
Despite some harmonic opening notes, however, discord threatens. Recall that on the argument 
view, thought experiments and arguments are justified in virtue of their formal properties. Yet on 
the material theory of induction, arguments are justified in terms of their material (and not 
formal) properties. Let us consider the tension in more detail. 
Where exactly does it stem from? First, there is Norton’s oft-repeated claim that the argument 
view should hold for all thought experiments, including inductive ones. Second, there are 
readings of some of the seven theses mentioned above which contribute to the tension if “logic” 
and “argument” are understood formally, as originally intended. For example, the Identity thesis 
claims that all thought experiments are arguments. This need not be problematic, but, as we saw, 
“arguments” were intended to be formal entities governed by a logic, which is an evaluative 
system that “governs” inferences via a focus on formal properties. This cannot be held 
consistently with the material theory of induction, since a material logic of induction does not 
govern via a focus on formal properties. Second, the Elimination thesis claims that the 
epistemology of thought experiments can be reduced to the epistemology of arguments. This is 
problematic because the epistemology of arguments that Norton originally presented was the 
formal logic of arguments. If the material theory of induction is correct, no epistemological 
account of inductive inference that focuses only on formal features could ever succeed, thus, we 
cannot reduce the epistemology of thought experiments to a formal epistemology of arguments. 
Finally, the Reliability thesis states that if a thought experiment cannot be justified by a (formal) 
logic, there is no way to tell if it is justified or not. Again, this contrasts with the material theory, 
according to which there are ways to tell whether an inference is justified other than by reference 
to its formal properties: namely, by investigating the inference’s material principles. 
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What about Norton’s argument for his position: is this compatible with the material theory of 
induction? The main sources of support for the seven theses are premises A), B), C) and D) in 
the reconstruction given above. A) is just the Empiricist thesis, which coheres very nicely with 
the material theory of induction since that theory tries to explain the justification of inductive 
inferences not in terms of abstract logical forms, but facts, which (it is assumed), ultimately 
reduce to experience. But A) is an assumption, and therefore cannot be relied upon (or denied) 
without begging the question. D) is the Reliability thesis, which (as mentioned immediately 
above), clashes with the material theory of induction if it is read as originally formulated. The 
premises B) and C) are left, and I think they must be the main pieces of evidence for the 
argument view. They are both inductive inferences. In B), Norton notes that all thought 
experiments he knows of can be reconstructed as arguments. From this he induces to the 
logically stronger claim that, generally, all thought experiments will be reconstructible as 
arguments. In step C), he notes that all thought experiments he knows of have conclusions that 
are equally justified as those of their logical reconstructions. From this he induces to the logically 
stronger claim that all thought experiments have conclusions that will be equally justified as 
those of their logical reconstructions. These are both inductive inferences, and according to the 
material theory of induction, such inferences succeed or fail based on their material principles. 
So what are the relevant material principles in these cases?  
Remember bismuth: inducing from the melting point of one pure sample of bismuth to the 
melting point of another pure sample is (relatively) safe because bismuth is a special kind of 
thing such that all its samples generally have the same melting point. In the cases we are 
interested in, we need some material principle about the kind of thing that thought experiments 
are, which will support the inductive inferences in B) and C).  
For B), we need a reason to believe that the nature of thought experiments is such that all thought 
experiments will always be amenable to logical reconstruction. The material principle underlying 
this inference is that thought experiments all admit of the distinction between form and content, 
and their forms can be used to identify them. Since a logic (for Norton) is a system that evaluates 
inferences based on their formal properties, then, if all thought experiments are as described, 
logicians should be able to reconstruct all thought experiments. Now, there is a sense in which 
we may individuate arguments according to their formal properties, even on the material theory. 
For example, even Norton identifies some inductive arguments as inferences to the best 
explanation and others as arguments by analogy. However, in a more fundamental sense, there is 
still tension here, since Norton denies that we can (or should) separate the formal from the 
material elements of an inference. He writes, “if one adopts a material theory of induction, one 
no longer separates factual content from the rules of inductive inference” (2014, 672). In other 
words, this material principle (which might work for deductive thought experiments) contradicts 
Norton’s new characterization of inductive logic, according to which the formal properties of 
inferences are irrelevant to their status as inductive arguments. But I will not dwell on this, since, 
as mentioned, there is a sense in which we can still use formal properties to identify arguments, 
even assuming the truth of the material theory of induction. 
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The case of C) is more interesting and more difficult. In C), we induce from the fact that the 
conclusions of many thought experiments enjoy exactly as much justification as the conclusions 
of their logical reconstructions do, to the claim that the conclusions of all thought experiments 
will be exactly as justified as the conclusions of their logical reconstructions. To justify this 
move, we need a material principle that grounds the conclusion of the inductive argument in 
some fact about the nature of thought experiments. The material principle assumed by the 
original argument view seems to be something like this: thought experiments (and arguments) 
are formal objects, and the only way to justify a formal object is via some formal logic. Thus, the 
conclusion of any thought experiment will always be exactly as justified as its reconstruction, 
because they have the same source of justification: namely, their formal properties. But once we 
introduce the material theory of induction, we no longer use the formal properties of inferences 
to determine their justificatory status. Norton writes, “merely stating an inference schema does 
not automatically make it a good one. In familiar deductive cases, we discern that they are good 
because of the meaning of the connectives. We cannot do the same for inductive schemas” 
(forthcoming, prolog, 7). Thus, the formal properties of inductive thought experiments and 
arguments are irrelevant to their justificatory status, and we lose our reason for thinking that 
thought experiments will always be equally justified as their reconstructed arguments are, if we 
use the presumed material principle. 
In sum, the inductive generalization in step C) of Norton’s argument requires a material 
principle, and the material principle that Norton would have chosen is no longer available once 
we introduce the material theory of induction. And this blocks the passage to E), F), G) and H) in 
his argument for the argument view. 
To eliminate the tension between the two views, something has to go. Perhaps the easiest thing to 
do is to break apart the argument view into a deductive and inductive account. Norton is clear 
that the (formal) argument view is meant to work for all thought experiments, whether deductive 
or inductive. But he could alter this, so that we have a formal argument view for deductive 
thought experiments and a material argument view for inductive thought experiments.6 For 
deductive thought experiments, the argument from A) to H) then remains as it was originally. 
But in the case of inductive thought experiments, we need a new material principle that suggests 
that the justificatory status of all thought experiments will be exactly the same as their 
reconstructed arguments. The old material principle was that all thought experiments admit of 
the distinction between form and content, and are justified in virtue of their formal properties. 
Perhaps the new material principle could be that all inductive thought experiments (and 
arguments) admit of the distinction between what warrants (the material principles) and what is 
warranted (the conclusion of the argument or thought experiment). Since both thought 
                                                 
6 There are hints that Norton’s material theory of induction might account for deductive inference as well (see 
Brigandt 2010). I think this interpretation of the material theory is exciting. And aspects of the argument view even 
suggest it. For example, as an anonymous referee pointed out, since knowledge-producing deductive thought 
experiments must be sound, we have to justify their premises, and those justifications might be inductive. But on the 
solution I am now considering to the above-mentioned tension (which I think is Norton’s preferred solution), we 
must rule out treating deduction in a material way. If we were to pursue that option, we would have to abandon the 
original argument view completely. 
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experiments and arguments admit of this distinction and are justified in the same way, we can 
infer that they will always be equally justified.7 
However, there are worries here as well. First, on its own, the new material principle doesn’t 
suggest that thought experiments will always be as justified as their reconstructions. All it says is 
that thought experiments admit of the distinction between what warrants and what is warranted, 
and their conclusion will be warranted by material principles. It seems perfectly possible that a 
thought experiment and its reconstruction could be warranted by different material principles. It 
also seems possible that two different inferences, warranted by the same material principles, 
might be unequally justified.  
Second, it is possible that many things which aren’t arguments will admit of the distinction 
between what warrants and what is warranted. For example, laboratory experiments admit of that 
distinction, yet they are not arguments. Or consider justification via perception: when I see 
raindrops through my window, I justifiably come to believe that it is raining. This event admits 
of the distinction between what warrants and what is warranted (the perception warrants the 
belief). Yet, no one would claim that I am arguing. Or consider emotional episodes. States of 
affairs warrant certain emotions (like righteous indignation), but surely not all emotional 
episodes are logical arguments.8  
Third, whatever the material principle is, it must be consistent with the material theory of 
induction. On the material theory, Norton takes inference to be a non-psychological relation of 
logical support. He restricts “notions of inference and logic to relations of deductive and 
inductive support between propositions, independently of our beliefs and thought processes” 
(forthcoming ch. 1, 1-2). “An inference from proposition A to proposition B is a logical relation 
between the two propositions as sanctioned by some logic…This usage is to be contrasted with a 
psychologized notion of the term ‘inference’ that will not be employed here” (forthcoming, ch. 1, 
2). Surely arguing requires inferring. But what is the mental act of inferring, on this account? It 
seems to be only recognizing that some logical relation holds. But thought experiments involve 
agency: when we perform a thought experiment, we do more than merely observe the presence 
of logical connections between facts. This gets even murkier when Norton claims that logical 
relations of support are themselves facts (forthcoming ch. 1, 22). If thought experiments are just 
facts transformed by other facts, where do humans fit in? If the agent is no more than a spectator, 
this doesn’t match the phenomenology of thought experiments.9 
Finally, even if Norton succeeded in defending this version of the argument view, it would be 
accepted by all parties to the debate about thought experiments. Its main claim, that the 
conclusion of a thought experiment is justified by virtue of its content and not its logical form, 
only contradicts Norton’s original account and no one else’s. The disagreement in the literature 
                                                 
7 Norton suggested this idea to me by personal communication. 
8 One could try to exclude perceptions and emotions by claiming that they are non-propositional, and arguments 
must have propositions as parts. This would be controversial, but even if successful, it would not help Norton 
because Norton does not want to limit arguments to manipulations of propositions (2004b, 53). 
9 This was also a problem for the original argument view. I thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
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on thought experiments is not about whether the conclusions of thought experiments are justified 
by facts, but about how we mentally mobilize the facts in our possession to produce new 
knowledge from those facts.  
Given these difficulties, we must make more drastic changes. One possibility is to modify the 
material theory to bring it in line with the argument view. Another is to hold the material theory 
constant and modify the argument view. I’ll quickly consider the first before pursuing the 
second. In the end, I will suggest a new version of the argument view that avoids the tension. 
5 Modifying the Material Theory of Induction 
One way to save the argument view would be to allow that induction is still (partially) formal. In 
this case, thought experiments can be (partially) justified in virtue of their logical properties, as 
the argument view claims. Perhaps Norton would be willing to make such a move; after all, 
inductions have local forms, or “mini-logics,” which might contribute to a “dual view” of 
inductive justification, according to which both material principles and local logical schema 
contribute to the justification of an inductive argument. 
But Norton makes several claims that seem to disqualify this as an option. For example, 
The material theory of induction arises when we assume that the truth of these 
background factual presumptions is all that is needed for the inductive inference to be 
warranted. One might imagine that this might not be so. The facts, we might suppose, 
play only a partial role in warranting the inductive inference. Might there still be a 
residual universal formal schema or inductive rule that contributes to the warrant? Such a 
schema or rule, however, would in turn be subject to the same analysis just given. 
(Forthcoming ch. 2, 10) 
Norton appears to be claiming that facts provide all the warrant for inductive inferences, which 
implies that formal schema provide none of the warrant. However, it is possible that Norton only 
means that inductive inferences do not receive any justification from instantiating universal 
schema, leaving open the possibility that they receive some justification from instantiating local 
(non-universal) schema. But what exactly does a local schema contribute to the overall 
justification of an inductive inference? A complete theory requires an answer. We do not want an 
account that only explains when we were warranted in using local inductive schema without 
explaining how the schema themselves are justified. This would be like explaining when we are 
warranted in using violence to solve a problem, and then claiming this as an explanation of how 
violence solves problems. 
However Norton seems to rule out this reading as well. For instance, 
These examples illustrate the general point: the factual assumption that ours is a 
hospitable world is the fact that, if true, warrants the inductive inference. It may not 
always be apparent that this fact warrants the inference. It may appear that the warrant is 
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still provided by some sort of schema. The inference to a future snowy winter, we may 
think, is still warranted by the schema: 
All past A’s have been B 
Therefore, the next A will be B. 
…This schema, if used at all, has a purely intermediate role. It does not have universal 
applicability. We can use it in the snowy winter case only because the requisite 
background facts authorize it, when we make the specific substitutions: ‘winter’ for A 
and ‘snowy’ for B. That is, there is a cascade of warrants that may pass through a 
schema. The cascade terminates in facts that are the final warrant of the inference.” 
(Forthcoming ch. 2, 9; my emphasis)  
The final warrant of the inference is different from the final warrant for using a schema in an 
inference. This seems to imply the purely material reading of the account. 
In sum, if local schema partially justify inductive arguments then Norton’s account does not 
explain this extra source of justification, and it is incomplete as an account of induction. If local 
schema provide no additional justification to inductive inferences (and I think this is what Norton 
intends), then we cannot rescue the argument view by introducing partially formal justification. 
We must try something else. 
6 Modifying the Argument View 
I think we can modify the argument view such that it still serves as part of a complete 
epistemological account of thought experiments. First, as mentioned above, Norton can keep the 
original argument view for deductive thought experiments. When it comes to inductive thought 
experiments, he can save a version of the argument view, which retains the Empiricist thesis in 
full, claims weaker (but more plausible) versions of the Identity, Reconstruction, Reliability and 
Epistemic theses, and rejects the Elimination and Empirical Psychological theses. Thus it would 
retain (plausible versions of) five out of seven of Norton’s theses, while also satisfying Norton’s 
more fundamental commitments. This and the next section will offer such a view for 
consideration. 
Norton claims that thought experiments are arguments, and the cognitive performance of a 
thought experiment is the cognitive execution of an argument. But it isn’t clear what that means 
if “argument” is defined by Norton in terms of non-psychological relations of warrant between 
premises and conclusion. Rather, it’s more plausible to analyze thought experiments in the other 
direction: thought experiments are complex cognitive actions performed by agents, parts of 
which can be reconstructed as explicit arguments. Indeed, this is precisely what Norton 
elsewhere suggests we do when it comes to the epistemology of scientific analogies. With 
respect to analogy, Norton finds  
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a curious divergence between the philosophical literature and the scientific literature. The 
philosophical literature categorizes analogy as a form of inference to be analyzed using 
some version of the formal methods of logical theory. The scientific literature approaches 
analogies as factual matters to be explored empirically; or at least it does so for the 
important analogies that figure centrally in the sciences. (Forthcoming, ch. 4, 2) 
Norton claims that we should stop trying to create general formal accounts of analogies, and 
instead evaluate each one as it is used in science, taking into account the facts of the matter 
relevant for each analogy. The same considerations should hold for thought experiments. In this 
case, we begin by pointing out 
a curious divergence between Norton’s argument view and the scientific literature. The 
argument view categorizes thought experiments as a form of inference to be analyzed 
using some version of the formal methods of logical theory. The scientific literature 
approaches thought experiments as factual matters to be explored empirically. 
In other words, we should treat thought experiments in the way that Norton encourages us to 
treat analogies. We should take them as they are, individually, without trying to create a unified 
formal logic that explains how they work in general. Treating thought experiments as we treat 
analogies (and other kinds of inference like inference to the best explanation – see Norton 
forthcoming chs. 8-9) brings thought experiments under the domain of the material theory of 
induction, and it also coheres nicely with Norton’s commitment to take scientific practice 
seriously. 
The resulting account, I will argue below, should be this: the conclusions of inductive thought 
experiments, insofar as they produce new knowledge, are justified according to the material 
theory. That is, according to their material (and not formal) properties. However, inductive 
thought experiments are not wholly identical to inductive arguments, and the epistemology of 
inductive thought experiments is not exhausted by the epistemology of inductive arguments. 
As mentioned above, everyone in the literature on thought experiments would accept this. For 
example, Brown would allow that what warrants us in believing the conclusion of a given 
thought experiment will be certain background facts that obtain. The difference is that the facts, 
for Brown, can include facts about relations between universals “perceived” through a priori 
intuition, while for Norton they must be reducible to sensory experience. Still, everyone in the 
debate would agree with Norton that it is facts, not logical forms, that provide the ultimate 
justification for the conclusion of a thought experiment. 
Yet, a material argument view can still claim something unique. Namely, it will usually be the 
case that the inductive step of all inductive thought experiments should be reconstructed as an 
argument. That reconstruction is required for identifying and justifying the thought experiment’s 
material principles.10 This weaker version of the argument view would not insist on the 
                                                 
10 Some authors have already encouraged Norton to soften the argument view so that it only recommends 
reconstruction. For example, Richard Arthur writes that “the reformulation of thought experiments as arguments is a 
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Eliminability thesis, because, as I’ll argue below, there is more to the epistemology of thought 
experiments than the inductive extension of their conclusions. It would also give up the 
Empirical Psychological thesis as well. That thesis was motivated at least partially by the 
Eliminability thesis: if we can eliminate thought experiments from our epistemology of science, 
it must be because there is nothing more to thought experiments than arguments. Therefore, the 
psychological performance of a thought experiment must be nothing more than the execution of 
a logical argument. But since the Eliminability thesis is no longer supported by the material 
theory, we lose the support it provided for the Empirical Psychological thesis. Also, if Norton is 
committed to taking local elements of scientific inference seriously, including the context and 
content, then he should be interested in the epistemologically relevant features that thought 
experiments have outside of their formal reconstructions. 
In sum, here is how Norton could frame a new argument view. Given a thought experiment, we 
first determine whether it is deductive or inductive (assuming that this is always possible in 
practice). Deductive thought experiments are treated according to the original argument view: 
they can be reconstructed into arguments whose formal properties determine their validity. 
Inductive thought experiments, however, must be treated differently. When faced with an 
inductive thought experiment we take each on its own terms and no longer claim that its 
epistemology should be pursued by formal reconstruction. And, for Norton, the most interesting 
aspect of the inductive thought experiment, whatever other aspects it might have, is the part of 
the thought experiment in which previous knowledge is extended, via induction, to new 
knowledge. This will be justified via a material principle. But it might not always be easy to see 
which material principle is required, and so reconstructing this aspect of the thought experiment 
might be helpful.11  
Now, when we speak of reconstructing the thought experiment as an argument, we are only 
speaking about reconstructing a part of the thought experiment as an argument: namely, the part 
in which the inductive step occurs. There may be many other epistemologically relevant parts of 
a thought experiment, but the new argument view does not concern itself with those other aspects 
(more on this in a moment). It allows that they exist, and does not deny epistemological accounts 
of them, because the new argument view does not claim exhaustiveness with respect to the 
epistemology of thought experiments. 
Finally, worries about the notion of “argument” involved in the new argument view disappear 
entirely. On the original view, Norton needed a notion of argument that was broad enough to 
include diagrammatic thought experiments and those with tacit premises and inferences. This 
threatened to make that view trivial, because if arguments are anything categorizable by a final 
or future logic, then every epistemologically interesting inference becomes an argument by 
                                                 
vital part of the scientific process” (1999, 228), without endorsing the elimination of thought experiments via their 
identification with arguments. See also Lennox (1991). However, what is being suggested now is not merely a 
softening of the argument view, but a way of saving and defending a material theory of inductive thought 
experiments. 
11 This is not a trivial position; some philosophers would disagree with it. One such philosopher is Paul Feyerabend, 
who argued that “reconstruction” and “clarification” are evils to be avoided (Stuart forthcoming a). 
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definition. However, on the new proposal, the notion of argument loses all importance: all we 
need is the ability to (re)present the inductive step of a thought experiment such that the relevant 
material principle(s) can be identified. Reconstructing this part of a thought experiment may 
require teasing apart discrete inferences and identifying relevant bits of information hidden in 
premises, but it is not at all controversial that this can be done, indeed, we do it all the time. 
Because we are no longer claiming that thought experiments are (and are only) arguments, we 
can even require that the bits of information be presented in propositional form. Our 
reconstructions can be propositional without requiring that thought experiments themselves be 
propositional. 
This version of the argument view avoids the tension mentioned above because it provides 
different accounts for inductive and deductive thought experiments, does not claim that the 
epistemology of arguments exhausts the epistemology of thought experiments, and gives up 
premises B) and C) of the argument for the argument view, as well as the Elimination and 
Empirical Psychological theses. But it is still an argument view, because it demands 
reconstruction of the inductive step of all inductive thought experiments into arguments, and 
evaluates those steps using the material theory of induction. 
We might wonder how well such a view stands up to scrutiny. For example, is it really an 
argument view in the spirit of Norton’s original, given that it does not reduce thought 
experiments entirely to arguments? And given that it would satisfy most of Norton’s critics, can 
we still think of it as separate contender for the “right” epistemology of thought experiments? 
The point of this paper was to see how well, if at all, the material theory of induction and the 
argument view of thought experiments could be made to cohere. I hope I have shown that they 
do not cohere perfectly, but that there are concessions that can be made which preserve all of the 
material theory, and much of the spirit of the argument view. I want to close by clarifying 
exactly which epistemological features of thought experiments the new argument view could 
explain, and which it could not. 
To this end, I want to distinguish between four epistemologically relevant aspects of thought 
experiments. The reason is that, as we will see, neither the original nor the new argument view 
can capture all of them. But the new argument view can be very useful in telling part of the full 
story. In other words, there is an aspect of the epistemology of thought experiments that this 
view handles very well. Insofar as the material theory handles this aspect better than the 
competitors, it should still be considered a substantial view in the epistemology of thought 
experiments. 
The different aspects are: the creation, cognitive performance, performer, and interpretation of a 
thought experiment. These are meant as different aspects from an epistemological, not an 
ontological, point of view. Once we separate these different targets of epistemological inquiry, 
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we see that a material theory of thought experiments can and should only attempt to account for 
the last of these.12 
7 A Pluralist Epistemology of Thought Experiments 
7.1 The argument view and the creation of thought experiments  
One aspect of thought experiments that the argument view cannot address is how we create an 
epistemically efficacious thought experiment. The “logic of discovery” is not usually discussed 
in the literature on thought experiments, but it should be. Neither the new nor the original 
argument view can provide an epistemological account of how to create an effective new thought 
experiment. We might think that to construct a good thought experiment, we simply construct a 
good argument. But thought experiments can pack a rhetorical punch that their reconstructed 
arguments cannot (Norton 1991). The argument view as an epistemological position does not 
have the resources to explain how we should, in general, take an argument and make it into a 
thought experiment. Because it is retrospective and anti-psychological, the argument view cannot 
serve as a normative guide for the construction of effective new thought experiments. 
Concluding his chapter on thought experiments, Ernst Mach wrote, “It is often said that enquiry 
cannot be taught. In a sense this is correct: the schemata of formal and even inductive logic 
cannot help much, for intellectual situations never quite repeat themselves” (1905, 146).13 
How do we provide a prescriptive, forward-looking way to construct epistemically efficacious 
thought experiments? I think the best way to do most new things will always be the same: by 
experiment. We generate a best guess for how to do something, try it, learn from our mistakes, 
try something else, etc., until we succeed. Equally with thought experiments: if we want to 
construct a new thought experiment, we must experiment. Experimenting is an activity with its 
own epistemology that already provides quite a bit of guidance. For example, we can ask 
whether and how our mental “instruments” are isolated from disturbances, whether we have 
accounted for experimental bias and sources of error, whether our instruments are well-calibrated 
and whether we have a theory of them, etc. (Franklin 1986, Galison 1987, Gooding 1990, 
Hacking 1983, Weber 2005).  
In sum, one epistemologically significant aspect of thought experiments is their creation. How 
thought experiments have been and should be created such that they increase our knowledge or 
understanding of the world is a normative epistemological question that the argument view does 
not answer. Norton could reply that the argument view only concerns the context of justification 
and not the context of discovery. But elsewhere he insists that even in the context of discovery, 
thought experiments are (and function epistemically as) arguments (2004b, 50). Perhaps Norton 
                                                 
12 There are other aspects that also deserve discussion, but which I don’t have space to address here. One is 
dialectical context. For an exploration of this, see Goffi and Roux (2018). For other divisions of aspects and phases 
of thought experiments, see, e.g., Mach (1905), Gooding (1990), Nersessian (1993), Reiner and Gilbert (2000), 
Buzzoni (2008), El Skaf and Imbert (2013), Chandrasekharan, S. et al. (2013), and Lenhard (2018).  
13 This is not to say that the material theory is in conflict with the epistemology of creation or discovery. Brigandt 
(2010) shows that it is not.  
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could reply that he never intended his view to cover the creation of new thought experiments. 
But Norton claims that the argument view “does supply a complete epistemology in the sense 
that all there is to learn about a thought experiment’s epistemic power can be recovered from 
considering it as an argument” (2004b, 55). He could argue that questions about how best to 
create a new thought experiment are not properly epistemological, but we would need a reason to 
believe that. It certainly does seem epistemologically interesting to ask how scientists develop 
successful thought experiments, and how they might improve their ways of doing this. 
7.2 The argument view and the performance of thought experiments 
A second aspect of thought experiments that is not covered by the argument view is their 
cognitive performance. To get at what I mean by this, consider a scientist who spends some time 
crafting a good thought experiment. When she finally succeeds, she has also performed the 
thought experiment. We might think that the performance is therefore the same as the creation of 
the thought experiment.14 But even if these always coincide, there are different epistemological 
questions we can ask about the creation and performance of a thought experiment. For example, 
when it comes to creation, we can ask whether a scientist went about trying to create a new 
thought experiment efficiently. For example, perhaps a thought experiment was built upon a 
needlessly complicated analogy when a simpler one would do. Meanwhile, holding the thought 
experiment fixed, we can ask which of several different people performed the thought 
experiment best, and why. That is, supposing that the thought experiment was intended to clarify 
the empirical content of a new concept, which performer imagined things such that their 
understanding of the new concept was increased the most? Since these kinds of question can be 
separated, I claim that the cognitive performance of a thought experiment can be separated (for 
epistemological purposes) from the creation of the same thought experiment. 
To focus on the performance of a thought experiment, we must also be able to distinguish 
between the performance and the interpretation of a thought experiment. This distinction has 
already been made in the case of laboratory experiments (Radder 1996). Ian Hacking calls it a 
“truism” that “experimenting is not stating or reporting but doing” (1991, 133). This distinction 
seems to hold equally well for thought experiments, which share some structural similarities with 
laboratory experiments (Brown 2007, 158; De Mey 2003; Häggqvist 1996). In both cases, we 
say that a scientist performs some concrete action which is then later described in sentences in 
the context of meetings, publication preprints, press releases, articles and textbooks. The 
epistemology of experimental acts and events is the epistemology of a set of actions performed 
on a particular system, not the epistemology of a set of claims and their relation to experience. 
The epistemic quality of an experimenter’s actions depends on the nature of those actions and 
their context. Thus, there were many performances of the Michelson-Morley experiment, some 
carried out underground, some on hilltops, and some in hot air balloons (Swenson 1970), and 
some of these were more accurate than others. Asking questions about what was done and why, 
                                                 
14 Indeed, this is claimed more or less explicitly by Buzzoni (2008) and Arcangeli (2018).  
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and what worked, is a kind of epistemological inquiry that is important for justifying the 
interpreted result of that experiment and its import for ether theory and Special Relativity. 
To evaluate the performance of a thought experiment, we should begin by asking what the 
epistemic aim of the thought experiment is. If it is knowledge, we might focus on the accuracy of 
mental representations, or the quality of rational intuition, since these are relevant to knowledge. 
If the aim is understanding, we have to be clear about what kind of understanding we have in 
mind: semantic, objectual, explanatory, model-based, practical, etc. (see, e.g., Baumberger et al. 
2016 for distinctions between kinds of understanding; see Stuart 2018 for this discussion applied 
to thought experiments). In each case, the way forward will be different. For semantic 
understanding, accurate representations might be less important than powerful metaphors or clear 
examples. 
Once the epistemic aim of the thought experiment is clear, we should ask how humans produce 
that aim given the set up of the thought experiment. Answers to this question will depend on the 
epistemological framework adopted, and the sort of thought experiment being analyzed. For 
those who support the view that thought experiments are manipulations of mental models, we 
might justify the reliability of the way we mentally evolve systems in realistic ways as a result of 
the evolution of the human mind, combined with conscious stipulations about the accuracy of 
representations and dynamics of the mental model as well as the skills or know-how of the agent 
(Nersessian 1992, 2007, 2018, Miščević 1992, 2007). An experimentalist explanation would 
focus on the isolation of the imaginary system, accounting for sources of bias and error, 
experimenter know-how, and so on (Gooding 1992a, 1992b; Sorensen 1992; Stuart 2016). 
Epistemological particularists would insist that each performance must be evaluated on its own 
for reliability, instead of making reference to general facts about, e.g., human cognitive 
evolution. 
For the epistemology of performance, the argument view is again inappropriate since Norton 
demurs from treating inductive inferences as psychological entities. Instead, inductive inferences 
are treated as objective relations of epistemic support between premises and conclusion. 
However, just as baking a cake is not awareness of the steps in a cookbook, performing a thought 
experiment is not awareness of relations of logical support. Norton might deny that the cognitive 
performance of a thought experiment is epistemologically relevant. However, this would be to 
uphold the distinction between the contexts of justification and discovery (or justification and 
psychology), which philosophers of science have rejected for good reasons that we need not 
rehearse here. 
So what is the epistemological significance of the cognitive performance of a thought 
experiment? One possibility is that the cognitive performance justifies a premise that supports 
the conclusion of a thought experiment. It produces a fact, phenomenon or experience, which an 
inductive argument then extends. Let me explain using Norton’s example of “Einstein’s best 
known thought experiment” (Einstein 1905, 37). Norton reconstructs that thought experiment 
into an argument as follows. 
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1. In the case of electromagnetic induction, through its positing of an absolute state of rest, 
classical electrodynamics distinguishes states of affairs which are not observationally 
distinct. 
 
Therefore in this case, classical electrodynamics violates  
 
2. Verifiability heuristic for theory construction (version 2) [“States of affairs which are not 
observationally distinct should not be distinguished by the theory”]: therefore 
3. Absolute velocities should be eliminated from the theoretical account of electromagnetic 
induction. 
4. Inductive step: This example is typical since (a) there are other examples of this type and 
(b) there is a history of unsuccessful attempts to detect this state of rest by optical 
experiments. Therefore 
5. Absolute velocities should be eliminated from electrodynamics. (Norton 1991, 136) 
This is how Norton reconstructs Einstein’s “best known” thought experiment as an argument. 
But I assume that many readers will not be able to guess which thought experiment is being 
presented here. The thought experiment is the thought experiment of the magnet and conductor. 
Here is an alternative presentation of the same thought experiment. Maxwell’s electrodynamics 
postulates an absolute velocity for light in a vacuum, which Maxwell takes to imply an absolute 
state of rest. This state was identified with properties of the aether. The thought experiment then 
proceeds as follows: you take a magnet at absolute rest and move a conductor through its 
magnetic field. This generates a measurable current. Now, you keep the conductor at absolute 
rest and move the magnet. You have the same relative motion, and the same measurable effects, 
so we should expect the same explanation for the two phenomena. But Maxwell’s theory 
provides a completely different kind of explanation for the latter measurement, because of its 
stipulation of absolute rest. "For if the magnet is in motion and the conductor at rest, there arises 
in the neighborhood of the magnet an electric field with a certain definite energy, producing a 
current at the places where parts of the conductor are situated. But if the magnet is stationary and 
the conductor in motion, no electric field arises in the neighborhood of the magnet" (Einstein 
1905). Einstein concludes that such a stipulation of absolute rest is unwarranted: it’s better to do 
without it (Norton 1991). 
What is important to note is that the cognitive performance of the thought experiment and the 
reconstruction do not share much in common, crucially, not even the same epistemic goal. The 
cognitive performance of the magnet-conductor thought experiment ends with the conclusion 
that the same relative motions of a magnet and conductor will produce the same measurable 
current. This justifies the first premise of the reconstructed argument. The rest of the argument 
involves verifiability heuristics for theory construction and a history of unsuccessful attempts to 
detect the aether and other things that do not seem to be part of the cognitive performance of the 
thought experiment at all. These are two different projects: one provides evidence for a fact, and 
the other aims to extend this fact inductively. The justification of each is also different. One is 
the justification of a cognitive output in terms of the reliability or perhaps the “presentational 
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phenomenology” (Chudnoff 2012) of certain cognitive processes, the other is the justification of 
an inductive extension of that cognitive output via material principles.  
7.3 The argument view and thought experimenting agents 
A third epistemological approach focuses on the properties of agents who perform thought 
experiments. This builds on the distinction between virtue epistemology and traditional or 
process-based approaches to epistemology (seminal texts include Kvanvig 1992, Sosa 1991 and 
Zagzebski 1996). According to virtue epistemology, we should be good thought experimenting 
agents, even if our epistemic vices escape detection and do not affect the outcome of a particular 
thought experiment. 
With respect to the epistemic virtues of agents, the argument view and the material theory of 
induction are again of no help since they are silent about the qualities that make an agent 
epistemically responsible or reliable as a reasoner. It might be that a fact about a reasoner is what 
enables her to extend her knowledge inductively, but the material theory concerns the warrant of 
inductive claims, not agents as a whole.  
To pursue this epistemological angle, we investigate the (natural or acquired) epistemic virtues, 
motivations or skills needed for successful thought experimenting. These might include good 
(modal) intuition, imaginativeness, memory, open-mindedness, intellectual courage, creativity, 
honesty, and integrity. Not many philosophers focus on these virtues of thought experimenters, 
but some do. For example, Buzzoni (2008) and Stuart (2017, 2019) examine the epistemology of 
the faculty of imagination in relation to thought experiments. Specifically, they ask how the 
imagination, a faculty utilized during all thought experiments, can be investigated such that those 
with strong and weak imaginations make better or worse thought experimenters. While exercises 
of imagination are important for the epistemology of the creation and cognitive performance of a 
thought experiment, the faculty of imagination is a feature of the agent, and thus falls under 
virtue epistemology. A virtue epistemology of thought experiments would be a welcome addition 
to the literature, but it is unlikely to come from the argument view or the material theory of 
induction. 
7.4 The argument view and the interpretation of thought experiments 
When we perform an experiment, we typically do so to answer a question. During the 
experiment, something “happens,” which we then attempt to interpret as an answer to the 
original question. Equally in a thought experiment, we set up a scenario, let it unfold, and then 
we have to find a way to make the outcome of that unfolding bear on our theoretical concerns. In 
the magnet-conductor case, the outcome is evidence for the claim that it is relative motion that is 
important for explaining the current in the conductor and that the explanations in the two cases 
should be the same. To marshal this against the postulation of an electromagnetic ether requires 
extra work. That extra work may be conceived of as part of the thought experiment, though it is 
analytically separable. Just as there were different ways of performing the Michelson-Morley 
experiment, there were different interpretations of what that experiment meant for ether theory 
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and Special Relativity, and some interpretations were better than others (e.g., Hacking 1991, 
133). 
Interpretations of a thought experiment will be evaluated using the material theory of induction 
when the thought experiment requires inductive extension to provide evidence for a theoretical 
claim. In these cases, the interpretation will involve an inductive step, which Norton can claim 
should be identified and clarified through reconstruction, and justified by appeal to material 
principles. We can show that the extension does or does not follow by determining which 
material principles are required by the inference, and how much epistemic risk is involved in 
presuming those principles. This is where the new argument view shines. This is especially clear 
when it comes to what Norton has called “thought experiment/anti-thought experiment pairs” 
(2004a, 1140-1142; 2004b, 45-49) such as Newton’s and Mach’s bucket. What we must do, in 
such cases, is examine the operative material principles to see which is the more justified.15 
8 Happily Ever After? 
On a pluralist epistemology of thought experiments, we can examine a thought experiment by 
considering how it was created. We can explain how performances of the thought experiment 
reliably lead to its conclusion, perhaps by looking at our own performances or the performances 
of others. Different people have different cognitive abilities and will imagine the scenarios in 
slightly different ways, so the outcome of these cognitive exercises will depend on the 
individual. We can also examine the qualities of the agents that are relevant to their standing as 
good thought experimenters, for example, their receptivity to new evidence and ability to judge 
when and how much imagination to deploy. Finally, to explain how we properly or improperly 
interpret the imagined objects and events as bearing upon a theoretical claim, we may choose to 
employ the material theory (or deductive logic, or something else). With respect to this last 
aspect of the epistemology of thought experiments, Norton might be right that focusing on the 
psychological aspect of inferences veils epistemological considerations in unnecessary 
confusion. We don’t want to know whether this or that person interprets the objects and events 
imagined in a thought experiment in a certain way; we simply want to know whether the 
inductive extension is justified. 
Splitting up the epistemology of thought experiments makes their epistemology more 
complicated, but that’s how it should be, since they are complicated things. Also, it recovers 
several important features of Norton’s original argument view. Thought experiments should be 
reconstructed as arguments in the sense that the theoretical interpretation of a thought experiment 
should be so reconstructed. The creation and performance of thought experiments, as well as the 
relevant character traits of thought experiments, however, are also important for a complete 
                                                 
15 Other (unitary) accounts have trouble with such cases. If Newton and Mach both proceed by rational intuition, it 
isn’t clear whose intuition is to be preferred, or why. Likewise, if Newton and Mach both proceed by manipulating 
mental models, we can ask whose model is a more accurate representation of the target system. But sometimes, the 
best thought experiment is not the one that represents the world most accurately. For example, if Galileo’s falling 
bodies thought experiment was more accurate to the way things are in reality, the conclusion would not follow 
(Stuart forthcoming b). 
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epistemology of thought experiments, and these cannot or need not be reconstructed as logical 
arguments. 
Also, Norton can still claim that inductive thought experiments amplify knowledge inductively, 
and that the conclusions of inductive arguments are justified in virtue of material principles. 
Finally, it’s important to note that a pluralist epistemology of thought experiments would not 
necessarily introduce anything that contradicts Norton’s empiricism. For example, to investigate 
the cognitive performance of a thought experiment, what is required might only be empirical 
research into human cognition (Brendel 2018, 291; Gendler 2004, 1161; Nersessian 1992), and 
not the introduction of a faculty of rational intuition. 
In sum, the suggestion is to retain intuitive aspects of the argument view for the epistemology of 
our theoretical interpretations of thought experiments, weaken the Identity, Reconstruction, 
Reliability and Epistemic theses, and drop the Elimination and Empirical Psychological theses. 
9 Conclusion 
There is a tension between Norton’s material theory of induction and his argument view of 
thought experiments. In considering how to avoid this tension, minimal modifications were 
attempted, but found unsatisfactory. I suggested further modifications meant to accord with 
Norton’s empiricism and the attention he pays to scientific practice. My suggestion is to allow 
that thought experiments have several epistemologically relevant aspects, and that a material 
argument view does not account for all of them. On a pluralist interpretation, a modified version 
of the argument view that is consistent with the material theory of induction tells only one part of 
the story, but an important one. 
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